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The Limits of Antitrust
Frank H. Easterbrook*
The goal of antitrust is to perfect the operation of competitive markets. What does this mean? A "competitive market" is not necessarily the one with the most rivalry
moment-to-moment. The auction in which atomistically
small buyers and sellers continuously shout out bid and
asked prices, the picture of "perfect competition" found
in economic texts, is a hypothetical construct. Every market entails substantial cooperation over some domain in
order to facilitate competition elsewhere. Every firm has
webs of internal cooperation. Exxon entails far more coordination than the average cartel. Every joint venture,
every partnership, indeed every contract creates cooperation among people who might otherwise be rivals. Markets themselves are organized. The Chicago Board of
Trade, perhaps the closest of modern markets to the textbook ideal, has a sheaf of rules and cooperative arrangements that reduce the cost of competition.
The dichotomy between cooperation inside a "firm"
and competition in a "market" is just a convenient shorthand for a far more complicated continuum. Antitrust
law permits, even encourages, cooperation within a
"firm," for such cooperation is the basis of economic productivity. But everything done within a firm could be done
by market transactions as well. The degree of integration
is variable, and some firms are integrated through many
more stages of production than others. The firm itself is
just a legal name for a complicated set of contractual arrangements among workers, managers, and contributors
of capital. The firm expands to include more and more
such contractual arrangements until, at the margin, the
costs of controlling additional production internally equal
the costs of coordinating production through market or
"spot" transactions with "outsiders." The internal costs
may include the difficulty of coordination, the difficulty
of giving correct incentives to agents, and the loss of information that markets offer in the form of prices. The ways
in which these costs compare with the costs of organizing
and maintaining markets are not fixed. Thus, there is no
"right" balance between inside and outside transactions.
There is only an ever-shifting equilibrium, differing from
firm to firm, product to product, and time to time, as the
relative costs of internal and market operations change.
*Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
and Senior Lecturer in Law, the University of Chicago Law
School. This essay was delivered as the inaugural Susman, Godfrey &McGowan Centennial Litigation Lecture at the University
of Texas on April 4, 1984, and was subsequently published in 63
Texas L. Rev. 1 (1984). This reprinting omits some text and al-

most all footnotes. The omissions are not indicated. It is reprinted

inrevised form by permission. 0 The University of Texas 1984.
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If all economic arrangements entail extensive cooperation, how is an antitrust court to proceed? Unless the
court knows the "right" balance between competition and
cooperation in each market, it does not know in which direction to move. Are 10-year exclusive dealing contracts
between oil companies and service stations too long? Too
short? Just right? Does it matter whether there are two oil
companies or twenty? 200 stations or 20,000? Is a
Herfindahl-Hirschmann Index of concentration in titanium dioxide of 3000 too high? Too low? Just right? If the
court tries to move the economy in the direction of the
textbook model of atomistic auctions, it is sure to be
wrong a great deal of the time. If the court tries to do anything else, it is at sea.
A fundamental difficulty facing the court is the incommensurability of the stakes. If the court errs by condemning a beneficial practice, the benefits may be lost for good.
Any other firm that uses the condemned practice faces
sanctions in the name of stare decisis, no matter the benefits. If the court errs by permitting a deleterious practice,
though, the welfare loss decreases over time. Monopoly is
self-destructive. Monopoly prices eventually attract entry.
True, this long run may be a long time coming, with loss to
society inthe interim. The central purpose of antitrust is to
speed up the arrival of the long run. But this should not
obscure the point: judicial errors that tolerate baleful
practices are self-correcting, while erroneous condemnations are not.
In most cases even a perfectly informed court will have
trouble deciding what the optimal long-run structure of
the industry is, because there is no "right" balance between cooperation and competition. The judge has no
benchmark. Small wonder that the history of antitrust is
filled with decisions that now seem blunders.
Enforcement of the rule against naked horizontal restraints appears to be beneficial. But suits against mergers
more often than not have attacked combinations that increased efficiency, and the dissolution of mergers has led
to higher prices in the product market. There are good theoretical reasons to believe that the costs of other enforcement efforts have exceeded the benefits. Indeed, from
time to time the Supreme Court explicitly states that it is
sacrificing economic efficiency to other goals. I do not
think such sacrifices are appropriate in antitrust, but that
is another debate. Whether courts try to trade efficiency
against other goals is less important than whether they do.
Antitrust is costly. The judges act with imperfect information about the effects of the practices at stake. The
costs of action and information are the limits of antitrust.
I ask in this essay how we should respond to these limits.
1. Ignorance and Inhospitality in Antitrust
Donald Turner once described the "inhospitality tradition of antitrust." The tradition is that judges view each
business practice with suspicion, always wondering how
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firms are using it to harm consumers. If the defendant
cannot convince the judge that its practices are an essential
feature of competition, the judge forbids their use.
Inhospitality is an old tradition. Adam Smith stated
that businessmen could hardly begin to talk before their
thoughts turned to restraint of trade. Jeremy Bentham
and Oliver Wendell Holmes gave us a "bad man" vision of
the law. George Stigler gave us a view of politics in which
interest groups "purchase" legislation to suppress competition. Economists as well as judges are suspicious: "If an
economist finds something .

.

. that he does not under-

stand, he looks for a monopoly explanation. And as in
this field we are very ignorant, the number of ununderstandable practices tends to be rather large, and the reliance on a monopoly explanation frequent."'
Yet all business arrangements entail some cooperation,
if only the cooperation in delivering the product pursuant
to a contract of sale. Cooperation is the source of monopoly, yet it is also the engine of efficiency. Firms organize
some span of activities the better to compete with others.
No surprise that antitrust enforcers and courts, charged
with finding the anticompetitive cooperation in a maze of
beneficial cooperation, should turn a suspicious eye on
practices that seem to entail cooperation without competitive benefit.
The inhospitality tradition of antitrust has proved very
costly. The costs were inevitable. Wisdom lags far behind
the market. It is useful for many purposes to think of market behavior as random. Firms try dozens of practices.
Most of them are flops, and the firms must try something
else or disappear. Other practices offer something extra to
consumers-they reduce costs or improve quality-and so
they survive. In a competitive struggle the firms that use
the best practices survive. Mistakes are buried.
Why do particular practices work? The firms that selected the practices may or may not know what is special
about them. They can describe what they do, but the why
is more difficult. Only someone with a very detailed
knowledge of the market process, as well as the time and
data needed for evaluation, would be able to answer that
question. Sometimes no one can answer it.
Ignorance would be tolerable but for the fact that every
successful competitive practice has victims. The more successful a new method of making and distributing a product, the more victims, the deeper the victims' injury. Joseph Schumpeter called competition a "gale of creative
destruction." It is a never-ending process of weeding out
the sluggish and the inefficient. Yet those who lose in the
competitive struggle do not view the outcome as just.
They are probably less knowledgeable than the average
business executive about why they failed and others suc'Coase, IndustrialOrganization:A ProposalforResearch, in 3

Policy Issues and Research Opportunities in Industrial Organiza-

tion 59, 67 (V Fuchs ed. 1972).
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ceeded. (If they knew what went wrong, they might have
improved.)
The gale of creative destruction produces victims before
it produces economic theories and proof of what is beneficial. The antitrust laws invite these victims to take their
grievances to court. They hire lawyers who know less
about the businesses than the people they represent. As
the case arrives in court, the judge sees a business practice
that has caused a formerly successful business to fail or to
be deprived of a profitable opportunity ("foreclosure").
The judge knows even less about the business than the
lawyers. At first hearing, the failure or lost opportunity is
bound to seem a reduction in competition. Fewer competitors remain, and fewness is the definition of monopoly
(or at least oligopoly). The defendant is unlikely to have a
good explanation for its success. The time is not ripe.
When the defendant lacks a powerful explanation for its
conduct, and the evidence points to "exclusion," a judge
is likely to conclude: "Why not prohibit this practice? If it
is anticompetitive, the prohibition will be beneficial. If it
is not anticompetitive, the prohibition will be harmless;
the defendant cannot tell me why the practice is essential
to efficiency."
Reasoning of this sort has led to the condemnationoften under a per se rule-of horizontal agreements by the
dozen as well as tie-ins, resale price maintenance, vertical
territorial and customer restrictions, patent pools, block
booking, and a host of other business practices. The Supreme Court once said that "[t]ying agreements serve
hardly any purpose beyond the suppression of competition,"I a phrase it has applied to many other practices. But
it is not true. Economists have developed procompetitive
explanations for all of these practices, sometimes several
explanations for each practice. Then, too, practices that
were deleterious yesterday may yield benefits today, as the
balance of advantage between contractual and market organization changes. By the time scholars understand why
the practice succeeded, it is too late.
It is too late in the sense that years of efficient business
practices have been lost. Too late in the sense that the
Court may invoke stare decisis, and some member of
Congress will call for the impeachment of the head of the
Antitrust Division who takes the new learning seriously.
Too late in the sense that most people are comfortable
with the way things are and do not like change. Some are
intellectually comfortable, others (those whose business
would be threatened by the competition from the practice
in question) are financially comfortable. The prohibitory
rules create their own constituencies.
Too late, finally, in the sense that businesses abandon
the justifications newly opened to them. Once a practice
has been declared unlawful, a business is likely to defend a
'Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293, 305-06
(1949).
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lawsuit by denying that it engaged in the practice. Rarely
will it say: "Yes, we did that, and here is why it is economically beneficial that we did." Judges thus are deprived of
opportunities to reconsider, with the light of knowledge,
what they decided in ignorance. This was brought home
forcefully in the Monsanto case, in which the Supreme
Court declined the Solicitor General's invitation to reassess the per se rule against resale price maintenance. The
Court observed that the defendant had not asked the district court to overrule the earlier Supreme Court cases,
and thus the issue was foreclosed.
The practices that come before the courts today are
more complex than "naked" tying or resale price maintenance, and the questions are more difficult. One recent
case presented issues arising out of the "blanket license"
issued by ASCAP and BMI, two performing rights societies, to those who play music. At one level, the blanket
license is a raw price fixing agreement among almost all rivals in the market. At another level, the license is a costreducing device, allowing those who want music to get
what they need without thousands of individual licensing
transactions. The Supreme Court thought this sufficiently
complex that it called for application of the Rule of Reason, which has hurled the lower courts into confusion.
Another case presented an agreement among physicians
in Arizona. The physicians specified payments from insurance companies that they would accept in satisfaction
of all obligations of the insureds. At one level this appears
to be raw price fixing. At another level it is a signalling device by which the lower-price physicians can identify
themselves and through which the physicians offer to
share some of the insurance function, thus addressing a
problem of moral hazard. This time the Court, dividing
four to three, invoked the refrain that such agreements
"serve hardly any purpose beyond the suppression of
competition."
Last term the Court addressed a horizontal arrangement among the nation's colleges controlling the number
of college football games available for broadcast. At one
level this is a raw cartel; the NCAA has reduced the number of different contests shown on TV. At another the arrangement is like the cooperation inside any firm, in
which the firm adopts the arrangements that make it most
likely to succeed in competition with other firms. The
NCAA is different from a firm only because integration is
incomplete-cooperation on TV coexists with competition for talent and competition over the field. The NCAA
portrayed its practices as elements in a struggle involving
pro football, other sports, and entertainment in general;
all were trying to attract viewers in a much larger
advertising-entertainment business. The business as a
whole required cooperation; Oklahoma did not want to
destroy Nebraska and take Nebraska's business. The response of the lower courts: "Not persuaded," to which the
Supreme Court added: "Not clearly erroneous."
5

"Not persuaded" is a common answer. Many times
there are no satisfactory explanations. Their development
comes too late. Other times the explanation is very difficult. Even when people know why business practices work
-which is not very often-the explanation is hard to convey. It may entail some fancy theory or complicated
econometrics. What can be conveyed in the academic seminar or the corporate board room is hard to articulate in a
trial, when the judge and jury lack economic training and
business expertise. The explanations may show how cooperative practices (or practices that exclude or harm rivals),
which appear at first glance to be restrictive, will have
longer-run benefits in competition. Such explanations
meet hostile reactions.
The response "not persuaded" is natural when a judge
is presented with a novel and difficult explanation of complex behavior. The benefits will not be precisely measurable. What evidence would suffice? The benefit of any arrangement is its improvement over the next-best method
of obtaining the same objective. If it is hard to find what a
given practice does, it is impossible to determine the difference in efficiency between a known practice and some
hypothetical alternative.
Still, the existence of an alternative matters in the rhetorical contest. For example, vertical integration may
achieve some of the benefits of restricted dealing. Extensive quality-control devices may be alternatives to tie-in
sales. Everything has its alternatives. It is easy for a court
to tell a party to use these alternatives. The alternatives
may be more costly, but the defendant will not be able to
show the amount of the difference. Because alternatives
exist, the explanation for a particular practice may appear
a too-clever effort to avoid the customary legal rules. The
explanation may appear to be an attack on competition itself. It seeks to justify cooperation, does it not? It seeks to
justify a market structure other than atomistic competition, does it not? Why should a judge be taken in? Any
claim of long-run competitive gain invites judicial skepticism, and properly so. With skepticism comes demands
for "better," perhaps unavailable, proof. Why should a
judge accept a fancy, novel, untested theory when he has
the less restrictive alternative, closer to the model of
atomistic competition, ready to hand?
The inescapable question is, what happens when a
judge is "not persuaded" by the explanation offered for a
complex practice? The inhospitality tradition calls for the
judge to condemn the practice. That is the wrong answer.
A judge who is not persuaded by the explanation should
not leap to the conclusion that whatever is poorly understood must be anticompetitive. The judge instead should
strive to find a way to distinguish the competitive from the
anticompetitive explanations of the practice. Each explanation predicts certain consequences-for example, most
anticompetitive explanations predict lower output and
higher prices. The judge should depend less on the lure of
6

the model of atomistic competition and more on the making and testing of predictions. The judge should employ
some presumptions and filters that will help to separate
pro- and anti-competitive explanations. These filters
would be the alternative to the inhospitality tradition, the
solution to the limits of antitrust.
The Shrinking Per Se Rule and the Empty
Rule of Reason
Antitrust has two modes of analysis: per se and Rule of
Reason. The per se method responds to the high costs of
information and litigation. Courts try to identify categories of practices so rarely beneficial that it makes sense to
prohibit the whole category even with knowledge that this
will condemn some beneficial instances. The costs of these
unfortunate condemnations are less than the costs-both
litigation and error costs-of making decisions case by
case about competitive benefit.
As time goes by, fewer and fewer things seem appropriate for per se condemnation. We see competitive benefits
in practices that once were thought uniformly pernicious.
Ten years ago tying arrangements, boycotts, territorial allocations, and resale price maintenance were unlawful per
se. Since then the Supreme Court has removed territorial
allocations from the per se category, removed tying arrangements in all but name, stood by while lower courts
quietly abrogated the per se treatment of boycotts, and invited reconsideration of the rule about resale price maintenance. It declined to apply the per se rule to a horizontal
arrangement involving almost 100 percent of the composers of music, on the ground that this arrangement produced competitive benefits. In the process, the Court announced that the per se rule may be applied only after
evaluation of the possible competitive consequences of an
arrangement-thus undercutting the simplicity that is the
principal justification for the rule.
These changes in the structure of antitrust analysis follow ineluctably from changes in our understanding of the
economic consequences of the practices involved. If condemnation per se depends on a conclusion that almost all
examples of some practice are deleterious, then discoveries about possible benefits lead to new legal rules. We
cannot condemn so quickly anymore. What we do not
condemn, we must study. The approved method of study
is the Rule of Reason.
A court could try to conduct a full inquiry into the economic costs and benefits of a particular business practice,
in the setting in which it has been used. But it is fantastic to
suppose that judges and juries could make such an evaluation. The welfare implications of most forms of business
conduct are beyond our ken. If we assembled twelve economists and gave them all the available data about a business practice, plus an unlimited computer budget, we
would not get agreement about whether the practice promoted consumers' welfare or economic efficiency more
II.

7

broadly defined. They would discover some gaps in the
data, some avenues requiring further exploration. Someone would invoke the principle of second best, claiming
that monopoly could be a beneficial offset to distortions
elsewhere. At least one of the economists would construct
a new model showing how the practice could reduce efficiency if certain things (unknowable from the data) were
present. A global inquiry invites no answer; it puts too
many things in issue. To get an answer to a practical problem, we must start with some assumptions and fixed
points of reference.
The economists might be able to reach agreement,
though not on the basis of exhaustive empirical inquiry.
They would resort to clues and shortcuts. They would use
their economic knowledge of other markets to draw inferences about this one. Inference could be based on survival: If a practice has lasted a long time, despite competitive pressure, the practice is very likely beneficial.
Otherwise the market position of the firm using the practice would have eroded under challenge from rivals. A
firm collecting an overcharge ultimately loses sales to
firms charging the competitive price. The evidence does
not always permit such long run evaluation, though, and
antitrust is designed to speed up the arrival of the long run
(so that firms lose market power faster). The economists
therefore might look at output changes in the short run.
Does the firm using the challenged practice gain sales or
lose them? An increase suggests efficiencies, a lower effective price per unit of quality delivered. Does the firm gain
market share or lose it? Again an increase suggests net
benefits. These tests require some difficult work-the
economists need to employ regression analysis to hold
other variables constant and isolate the effects of the challenged practice-but at least they offer a reliable rule of
thumb.
If the economist has a way to approach new practices, a
judge today has none. According to the Supreme Court,
"[T]he inquiry mandated by the Rule of Reason is
whether the challenged agreement is one that promotes
competition or one that suppresses competition. . . .
[T]he purpose of the analysis is to form a judgment about
the competitive significance of the restraint."' How does a
court tell whether the arrangement promotes or suppresses competition? It must
consider the facts peculiar to the business to which the restraint is applied; its condition before and after the restraint was imposed; the nature of the restraint and its effect, actual or probable. The history of the restraint, the
evil believed to exist, the reason for adopting the particular remedy, the purpose or end sought to be achieved are
all relevant facts.'
'National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United States, 435
U.S. 679, 691-92 (1978).
'Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238
(1918).
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These formulations are empty. Judges and justices
rightly protest that courts cannot make these judgments.
"Courts are of limited utility in examining difficult economic problems. . . . [They are] ill-equipped and ill-suited
for such decision-making [and cannot] analyze, interpret,
and evaluate the myriad of competing interests and the
endless data that would surely be brought to bear on such
decisions."'
Of course judges cannot do what such open-ended formulas require. When everything is relevant, nothing is dispositive. Any one factor might or might not outweigh another, or all of the others, in the factfinder's
contemplation. The formulation offers no help to businesses planning their conduct. Faced with a list of such imponderables, lawyers must engage in ceaseless discovery
(they might find something bearing on a factor, and the
factor might be dispositive). The higher the stakes, the
more firms are willing to spend on discovery and litigation. The marginal week of discovery or trial just might
mean saving a few millions or tens of millions of dollars.
Litigation costs are the product of vague rules combined
with high stakes, and nowhere is that combination more
deadly than in antitrust litigation under the Rule of Reason.
Part of the difficulty in antitrust comes from ambiguity
in what we mean by competition. Antitrust aims at preserving competition as an instrument for creating economic efficiency. Yet as I pointed out in the introduction,
competition cannot be defined as the state of maximum rivalry, for that is a formula of disintegration. Today's cooperation creates both today's benefits and tomorrow's
competition. A joint venture extinguishes some competition yet creates more against other economic units. The
antitrust laws do not supply the time horizon for analysis,
and there is no "right" answer. For example, it is now understood that the grant of patent rights, though creating a
restriction of output during the patent's life, is important
to give people incentives to invent. There is a tradeoff between optimal incentives ex ante and optimal use of existing knowledge, and intensive efforts to specify the "right"
tradeoff have failed. The patent case is just a special application of the cooperation-competition balance. The
search for a right answer is similarly doomed.
III.

A-Filter Approach to Antitrust Scrutiny

A. The Value of Presumptions
Courts should use the economists' way out. They
should adopt some simple presumptions that structure antitrust inquiry. Strong presumptions would guide businesses in planning their affairs by making it possible for
counsel to state that some things do not create risks of lia'United States v. Topco Assocs., 405 U.S. 596, 609, 612 (1972)
(footnote omitted).
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bility. They would reduce the costs of litigation by designating as dispositive particular topics capable of resolution.
If presumptions let some socially undesirable practices
escape, the cost is bearable. The per se rule condemns
whole categories of practices even though some practices
in these categories are beneficial. The Court permits such
overbreadth because all rules are imprecise. One cannot
have the savings of decision by rule without accepting the
costs of mistakes. We accept these mistakes because almost all of the practices covered by per se rules are anticompetitive, and an approach favoring case-by-case adjudication (to prevent condemnation of beneficial practices
subsumed by the categories) would permit too many deleterious practices to escape condemnation. The same arguments lead to the conclusion that the Rule of Reason
should be replaced by more substantial guides for decision.
In which direction should these rules err? For a number
of reasons, errors on the side of excusing questionable
practices are preferable. First, because most forms of cooperation are beneficial, excusing a particular practice
about which we are ill-informed is unlikely to be harmful.
True, the world of economic theory is full of "existence
theorems"-proofs that under certain conditions
ordinarily beneficial practices could have undesirable
consequences. But we cannot live by existence theorems.
The costs of searching for these undesirable examples are
high. The costs of deterring beneficial conduct (a byproduct of any search for the undesirable examples) are high.
When most examples of a category of conduct are competitive, the rules of litigation should be "stacked" so that
they do not ensnare many of these practices just to make
sure that the few anticompetitive ones are caught. When
most examples of a practice are procompetitive or neutral,
the rules should have the same structure (although the opposite slant) as those that apply when almost all examples
are anticompetitive.
Second, the economic system corrects monopoly more
readily than it corrects judicial errors. There is no automatic way to expunge mistaken decisions of the Supreme
Court. A practice once condemned is likely to stay condemned, no matter its benefits. A monopolistic practice
wrongly excused will eventually yield to competition,
though, as the monopolist's higher prices attract rivalry.
Third, in many cases the costs of monopoly wrongly
permitted are small, while the costs of competition
wrongly condemned are large. A beneficial practice may
reduce the costs of production for every unit of output; a
monopolistic practice imposes loss only to the extent it
leads to a reduction of output. Under common assumptions about the elasticities of supply and demand, even a
small gain in productive efficiency may offset a substantial increase in price and the associated reduction in output. Other things equal, we should prefer the error of tol10

erating questionable conduct, which imposes losses over a
part of the range of output, to the error of condemning
beneficial conduct, which imposes losses over the whole
range of output.
The legal system should be designed to minimize the total costs of (1) anticompetitive practices that escape condemnation; (2) competitive practices that are condemned
or deterred; and (3)the system itself. The third is easiest to
understand. Some practices, although anticompetitive,
are not worth deterring. We do not hold three-week trials
about parking tickets. And when we do seek to deter, we
want to do so at the least cost. A shift to the use of presumptions addresses (3) directly, and a change in the content of the legal rules influences all three points.
Consideration (2) is especially important when most
practices in the category are beneficial. A legal system that
errs even a few percent of the time is likely to "catch"
mostly desirable practices. If five percent of "tying" arrangements are deleterious, and the legal system errs ten
percent of the time, it is apt to condemn twice as many
beneficial arrangements as it catches anticompetitive
ones. Better to change the presumption than to take this
risk.
B. Some Promising Filters
The remainder of this essay describes and defends a series of presumptions. The first two would be employed in
every case. The others would be used only if the defendant's practices offered potential economic benefits. All
of these help to screen out cases in which the risk of loss to
consumers and the economy is sufficiently small that there
is no need of extended inquiry and significant risk that inquiry would lead to wrongful condemnation or to the deterrence of competitive activity as firms try to steer clear
of the danger zone.
First, the plaintiff should be required to offer a logical
demonstration that the firm or firms employing the arrangement possess market power. The demonstration
need not entail the difficult market definition issues that
so embroil cases. Second, the plaintiff should be required
to demonstrate that the defendant's practices are capable
of enriching the defendant by harming consumers. That
is, the plaintiff must show that the defendant has an incentive to behave in an anticompetitive way and that antitrust
sanctions are necessary to correct the defendant's incentives.
If these two inquiries suggest that the firms have an
ability and incentive to behave in an anticompetitive way,
a court should inquire whether the restraint is "naked." If
the arrangement in question exists by itself-for example,
if a group of firms agree on price but do not integrate any
of their productive facilities-then it should be held unlawful. This is the function of the per se rule against cartels. The available evidence suggests that the application
of this rule is beneficial to the economy, and so does the
11

available economic theory. Cartels reduce output and
produce nothing in return.
The question whether a restraint is "naked" requires
some knowledge of its effects. The Broadcast Music inquiry plays a vital role here. The court appropriately attempts to discern whether a practice has potential competitive benefits, whether it can increase economic efficiency.
Only if an agreement passes this potential-benefit filter
would a court move on to the other inquiries.
The next question (the third filter) should be whether
firms in the industry use different methods of production
and distribution. If they do, then competition among
these methods should be adequate assurance of benefit. If
firms use similar arrangements, the court (fourth) should
ask whether the evidence is consistent with a reduction in
output. This entails (a) looking at changes in output
shortly after a practice was adopted, and (b) looking at
whether a practice has survived without substantial adverse effect on the defendants' market share. The fifth
and final filter uses the identity of the plaintiff to infer
something about the consequences of defendants' conduct. When a business rival brings suit, it is often safe to
infer that the arrangement is beneficial to consumers.
Only when a potentially efficient business practice
passes all five filters should a court undertake the heroic
efforts required by today's Rule of Reason. The use of the
filters will cut the inquiry short in most cases, saving substantially in litigation costs and uncertainties. It will structure the proceedings in the rest, leading courts to focus on
the most important issues.
Existing rules, unlike this proposal, ask the per se question first. But in recent years the per se inquiry has required more and more economic exposition. There is no
longer any real "shortcut" to condemnation. A defendant
may show that a practice is beneficial in fact and therefore
does not have the attributes that call for per se condemnation. Under NCAA the defendant may offer an economic
justification even of a "naked" restraint. The defendant's
opportunity to show benefits entails its obligation to assess competitive consequences, to which presumptions (1)
and (2) direct attention.
There is still a category of per se cases in which no justification is allowed, but the costs of finding examples of
this category have increased as courts have tried to refine
the boundaries of the per se class. It seems better to start
the inquiry with questions about power and incentives
than with questions that are essentially definitional. At the
same time, there is little to be lost. The value of a real per
se approach-that is, condemnation without offering the
defendant any chance to explain or justify its conducthas fallen steadily since 1890. Reductions in transportation costs have enlarged the size of markets, so that it is no
longer possible for a few firms to monopolize very many
markets no matter how hard they try. The creation of
world markets in many goods makes it difficult even for
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all firms in the United States to obtain monopoly profits.
Most modern studies show that even the most concentrated industries behave competitively. The increasing
power of competition, as well as the suspicion that cooperation may be beneficial in ways we do not understand or
cannot explain, counsel restraint in condemning practices
without at least a little inquiry into market power and incentives. I turn, then, to the five filters.
1. Market Power. The first filter is market power. A
court should look at the practices alleged by the plaintiff
and ask whether the defendant or defendants have market
power. If the complaint attacks the practices of a single
firm, the court should look at that firm's power; if the
plaintiff challenges the cooperative practices of many
firms, the court should ask whether the defendants have
power if they act together as alleged.
Market power is the ability to raise price significantly
without losing so many sales that the increase is unprofitable. Most firms have a little power, because their products are not perfectly interchangeable with the goods of
others. But few firms have substantial power over price.
Firms that lack power cannot injure competition no matter how hard they try. They may injure a few consumers,
or a few rivals, or themselves (see 2 below) by selecting
"anticompetitive" tactics. When the firms lack market
power, though, they cannot persist in deleterious practices. Rival firms will offer the consumers better deals. Rivals' better offers will stamp out bad practices faster than
the judicial process can. For these and other reasons many
lower courts have held that proof of market power is an
indispensable first step in any case under the Rule of Reason. The Supreme Court has established a market power
hurdle in tying cases, despite the nominally per se character of the tying offense, on the same ground offered here:
if the defendant lacks market power, other firms can offer
the customer a better deal, and there is no need for judicial
intervention.
Consider how cooperation could hurt consumers and
decrease economic efficiency. The usual method is an
agreement among rivals to raise price (the cartel). If the
parties to the agreement lack market power, though, they
cannot reduce the industry's output-at least not by
enough to be observable in litigation. Other firms will
supply what consumers want at the competitive price, and
there will be no injury. Other cooperative practicesboycotts, vertical integration and restricted dealing, and
tie-ins-may raise rivals' costs of entry. For example,
industry-wide vertical integration may require a prospective entrant to come in at two levels (say, manufacturing
and distribution). This will take more time to arrange and
increase the risk the entrant faces. But when there is no
market power, many existing firms stand ready to sell on
at least one of these levels. This makes simultaneous entry
unnecessary. Vertical arrangements may lead to inferior
outcomes if there are unusual demand conditions, but
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again this depends on the existence of a monopolized or
tightly oligopolistic market. No power, no problem.
The market power inquiry logically precedes the question whether a restraint is "naked" and thus within the
scope of the per se rule. The inquiry is so ordered in tying
cases, and it should be in others as well. Not all cooperation is bad, and often it is hard to determine whether a restraint is "naked" for per se purposes. When the collaborators possess no market power, either their cooperation is
beneficial, in which event it will flourish, or it is not, in
which event it will die as rivals take the sales. When the
collaborators have no power, monopoly cannot be their
objective, and we must consider the more likely possibility
that the arrangements create efficiencies.
When there is no market power, the market is better
than the judicial process in discriminating the beneficial
from the detrimental. Judges who try to assess the merits
of the collaboration are apt to err, and the consequences
of these errors will be one-sided. If judges condemn efficient practices, they will disappear, their benefits lost. If
judges tolerate inefficient practices, the wrongly tolerated
practices will disappear under the onslaught of competition. The costs of judicial error are borne by consumers,
who lose the efficient practices and get nothing in return.
The history of antitrust is littered with practices condemned because of misunderstanding, when a simple
market power inquiry would have revealed that they could
not have caused injury. Sealy was a joint venture of about
thirty firms that made mattresses. It adopted territorial allocations, rules on pricing, and other practices of the same
sort any completely integrated firm applies to its plant
managers. The mattress business was unconcentrated,
and the restraints applied only to mattresses sold under
the Sealy name. Most of the thirty firms made and sold
non-Sealy brands in competition with Sealy products, and
hundreds more rivals competed against these thirty. The
restraints on Sealy-brand mattresses had the same sorts of
benefits as any other form of organization. They promoted efficient production, distribution, and advertising,
benefits of the sort now well-recognized. The Court held
the territorial limits on sales unlawful per se because they
were "horizontal." This exercise in formalism caused the
Court to overlook the fact that, horizontal or not, the
agreements could not have harmed competition and could
well have helped it.
Similarly, the Court held unlawful an arrangement under which small grocers introduced and promoted their
own "Topco" brand of goods. The grocers limited the territories in which the "Topco" brand (but not other brands)
could be sold. The grocery business is fiercely competitive, and these firms had a small share. If they had
merged, the transaction would have been almost too small
to notice. Again the Court said "horizontal therefore
bad"; again it condemned conduct that may have helped
promote the product and thus increase competition in re14

tail food as a whole yet could not possibly have harmed
consumers. Even a cursory search for market power
would have revealed that these practices had to be either
beneficial or harmless.
2. Logical Relation Between Profit and Reduced
Competition. The threat of antitrust liability is not the
only reason businesses shy away from certain practices.
Entrepreneurs fear business losses more than damages.
The business losses occur sooner and with greater certainty. Markets impose their judgments automatically.
Antitrust law is useful in making cartels and monopolistic practices unprofitable. The premise of the damages
remedy is that the threat of losses deters. Disgorgement of
overcharges brings home to the offender the loss it imposes on others, and the trebling makes up for the likelihood that the offense will escape detection and punishment. The deterrent threat assumes that businesses attend
to the risk of loss. If they do not, deterrence fails. If they
do pay attention to losses, though, then it is safe to confine antitrust remedies to practices by which businesses
obtain profits by harming competition. The market brings
home to the offender any losses it imposes on others-and
it brings them home more quickly than courts do.
The point is not that business losses perfectly penalize
business mistakes but that they do so better than the next
best alternative. The fundamental premise of antitrust is
the ability of competitive markets to drive firms toward
efficient operation. The entire corpus of antitrust doctrine
is based on the belief that markets do better than judges or
regulators in rewarding practices that create economic
benefit and penalizing others. The common belief that if
markets are imperfect then something else must be better
is a logical fallacy. One need not pretend that markets
work perfectly to see that they are better than judges at penalizing inappropriate conduct. Business executives do
not respond flawlessly to a decline in profit, but judges do
not respond to profit at all. The "business judgment rule"
of corporate law is based on the sound conclusion that
judges lack the information, experience, and incentives to
make business decisions. Judges therefore decline to substitute their judgment for that of the managers. Judges are
at the same comparative disadvantage in antitrust.
Some cases show how this filter would work in practice.
Grinnell purchased mechanical snubbers for use in building nuclear reactors. It bought a two-years' supply from
Pacific Scientific. Barry Wright Corporation, which had
been Grinnell's supplier, brought suit, contending that the
"exclusive" contract for a substantial portion of all snubbers reduced competition in the snubber market. If competition were reduced, though, suppliers of snubbers
would charge higher prices in the future. Grinnell would
be the poorer. It is a buyer of snubbers, not a producer.
Why would Grinnell shoot itself in the foot? If contracts
of this nature harm competition, the overcharges they cre15

ate will induce the purchasers to abandon the arrangements; if the purchasers want them, that is excellent evidence that they are efficient.
Many vertical arrangements may be handled in the
same manner. A manufacturer that adopts a system of resale price maintenance or closed territories allows the
dealer to increase its margin. From the manufacturer's
perspective, the difference between the wholesale and retail price is the "cost of distribution," which it wants to
keep as small as possible. For any given wholesale price,
the manufacturer wants the markup as small as possible in
order to sell additional units. Unless the vertical arrangement creates or enforces a cartel (which is rare), the manufacturer protects the consumer's interests. It will not permit the margin to rise unless the dealer supplies a service
that the customer values at more than the increase in price.
Many tying arrangements also may be handled from this
perspective. If the firm establishing the tie does not supply
the "tied" good itself, it has no reason to injure competition.
Purportedly exclusionary or predatory practices furnish more examples. The logical story of any exclusionary
practice is that a firm with market power adopts a strategy
to increase its rivals' costs. This strategy is costly to the aggressor too, but it plans to recoup the costs by raising its
prices after expelling the rival from the market or scaring
the rival out of entering. The aggressor may reduce its
price, and rivals must match the cut or lose sales; the aggressor may build a very large plant or introduce new
products, making entry less attractive or diminishing the
attraction of rivals' products to consumers; the aggressor
may buy upstream or downstream suppliers, forcing rivals
to search elsewhere for supplies; the list could be extended. These and other strategies are ambiguous. Low
prices and large plants may be competitive and beneficial,
or they may be exclusionary and harmful. We need a way
to distinguish competition from exclusion without penalizing competition. If the practices are exclusionary, they
will be profitable only if the aggressor can recoup. If the
aggressor can not, there is no reason for antitrust concern.
Either the business losses during the period of aggression
will act as the penalty, or the conduct will turn out to be
efficient.
The ongoing litigation about Japanese television sets
offers a perfect illustration. The plaintiffs maintain that
for the last fifteen years or more at least ten Japanese
manufacturers have sold TV sets at less than cost in order
to drive United States firms out of business. Such conduct
cannot possibly produce profits by harming competition,
however. If the Japanese firms drive some United States
firms out of business, they could not recoup. Fifteen years
of losses could be made up only by very high prices for the
indefinite future. (The losses are like investments, which
must be recovered with compound interest.) If the defendants should try to raise prices to such a level, they would
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attract new competition. There are no barriers to entry
into electronics, as the proliferation of computer and audio firms shows. The competition would come from resurgent United States firms, from other foreign firms
(Korea and many other nations make TV sets), and from
the defendants themselves. In order to recoup, the Japanese firms would need to suppress competition among
themselves. On plaintiffs' theory, the cartel would need to
last at least thirty years, far longer than any in history,
even when cartels were not illegal. None should be sanguine about the prospects of such a cartel, given each
firm's incentive to shave price and expand its share of
sales. The predation-recoupment story therefore does not
make sense, and we are left with the more plausible inference that the Japanese firms did not sell below cost in the
first place. They were just engaged in hard competition.
If courts had perfect information and wisdom, it might
be appropriate to da.mn all inefficient practices. The
threat of antitrust liability might speed up firms' recognition of their interests. If we are certain enough that some
practice is harmful and must be snuffed out, no penalty is
too high, no retribution too swift. But courts do not have
perfect information, and the judicial process is both slow
and costly. It is mistaken to suppose that because markets
correct business errors only slowly, judges must be better.
One must compare the costs and risks of the two processes.
The costs of the judicial process-including the costs of
errors, which deter beneficial practices-suggest the wisdom of letting the competitive process rather than the
courts deal with conduct that does not create profits by reducing competition. If the practice really is anticompetitive and privately unprofitable, it will go away in time. If
it persists, the appropriate inference is that it has competitive benefits. We may not yet understand these benefits,
but our understanding is not a condition of legality.
3. Widespread Adoption of Identical Practices. I
come now to the filters that should be employed if a practice passes the first two filters and a careful inquiry reveals
that it has potential competitive benefits. By the time the
inquiry gets this far, naked restraints will have been condemned, and obviously-harmless practices will have been
dismissed. The court will have for decision a variety of
practices that may or may not be beneficial to consumers.
It needs ways to separate the beneficial from the detrimental.
Most of the practices that get this far will be vertical arrangements-tying, restricted dealing, and the like. These
are forms of partial integration. They are more confined
than full integration and do not last as long, yet they reduce short-term rivalry. How should a court respond?
One filter is especially useful for these practices. Unless all
or almost all firms in an industry use the same vertical restraints, a case should be dismissed. The rationale for this
filter is that every one of the potentially anticompetitive
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outcomes of vertical arrangements depends on the uniformity of the practice. For example, resale price maintenance (RPM) or territorial restraints can facilitate or enforce a cartel only if all firms in the industry use identical
practices. If Sylvania uses RPM while GE and Sony do
not, the RPM cannot facilitate anyone's cartel. Dealers
that want to cheat on a dealers' cartel will sell more GE
sets at reduced prices. And if practices are not identical in
the manufacturing industry, the RPM cannot facilitate a
cartel there, either. The whole point of a "facilitating practice" is that when everyone does things the same way, this
reduces the number of things the cartel must monitor to
control cheating. When everyone does not do things the
same way, nothing can be "facilitated."
The argument that vertical practices may impede entry
by requiring the new entrant to come in with several products (or at several levels) simultaneously also depends on
uniform adherence to the restraint. If a monopoly manufacturer has long-term exclusive dealing contracts with its
distributors, its distribution network is "foreclosed" to a
would-be entrant. The prospective manufacturer must
come in on two levels (making plus distributing) or arrange for coordinated entry. But if there are four manufacturers in the industry, and only one or two use exclusive
distribution, the would-be entrant will find a group of distributors anxious to be its agents if it offers a better deal,
which it will. (Recall the hypothesis: The lack of entry allows the existing firms to charge a price above the competitive level. The new entrant will find distributors queueing
up if it charges a price closer to the competitive one. If the
existing firms charge only the competitive price, there is
no problem whether or not the new entrant can find distributors.)
The uniform-practice filter is exceptionally powerful. It
screens out almost all challenges to vertical practices. In
almost every market the manufacturers employ a staggering variety of selling methods. Some bundle products
together and others do not; some use restricted dealing
and others do not. It is hard to compile a list of ten cases in
the history of antitrust that would proceed past this filter.
Whatever explains a solitary manufacturer's use of RPM,
exclusive contracts, ties, or other practices, the practice
cannot be anticompetitive. Because other sellers use different methods, consumers have a choice. The competing
offers of different products and different methods are
competition at work.
4. Effect on Output and Survival. If arrangements
are anticompetitive, the output and market share of those
using them must fall. This is a simple application of the
Law of Demand. If a firm raises the effective price of a
product of given quality, it will sell less. Similarly, if a firm
improves the quality of a product and charges the same
price, it will sell more. If it both increases the price and increases the quality, it may sell more or less, depending on
whether consumers value the improvement at more than
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the cost. To take a trivial example, if Commodore puts a
new and better keyboard on its Commodore 64 computer,
it may raise its price a little to cover the extra cost. If its
sales increase despite the higher price, we know that the
change was worth the higher price, and then some, to consumers.
We can perform this test in many antitrust cases. Look
at what happens when the manufacturer adopts the challenged practice. Hold other things, such as demand, constant. There are statistical tools for doing this, if the data
are available. If the manufacturer's sales rise, the practice
confers benefits exceeding its costs. If they fall, that suggests (although it does not prove) that there are no benefits.
Most vertical arrangements appear to have increased
output. In GTESylvania the adoption of the territorial restraints coincided with an expansion of Sylvania's sales
and market share. United States Steel's "tie" increased its
sales of prefabricated houses and credit. The hospital in
Hyde adopted its "tie" when it opened its doors; it grew
like Topsy and continues to expand at the expense of other
hospitals that use different staffing practices. In a number
of restricted dealing cases that did not reach the Supreme
Court, defendants put into evidence sophisticated economic studies of sales and share. So far as I am aware, in
every vertical case in which modern econometric methods
have been used, the economists found that the practices
expanded output.
Sometimes the challenged practices were adopted so
long ago that information about changes in output and
share is no longer available. If so, we can approach the
output question from a different perspective: did the practice survive? If a practice produces monopoly profits, the
firms using it ultimately lose their positions to those offering consumers a better deal. We can determine whether
this occurred.
Erosion may take a long time-and the firms will collect monopoly profits in the interim-but if the practice
extracts an overcharge, erosion happens sooner or later.
Even the best device for extracting an overcharge, merger
to monopoly, does not last forever. General Motors,
United States Steel, and other aggregations formed by
merger are now but shadows of their former selves (in
market share terms, anyway). Firms with impregnable
monopolies protected by patents lose them quickly after
the patents expire.
When the barriers to entry into the business are low, we
would expect the erosion of position to occur reasonably
quickly. The Antitrust Division's merger guidelines suggest
that two years is "reasonably quickly" in antitrust; the Division inquires how much new output would be available
within two years in response to a five percent increase in
price. But for some practices two years is too short. Prospective entrants recognize that a new distribution practice
may be abandoned by the firm that adopted it; firms do
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make mistakes. Rivals may wait before entering. And entry itself may take a while. Thus, for current purposes five
years may be a better guide than two.
The proposed filter, then, is that if a firm or group of
firms have employed some arrangement continuously for
five years, and have not substantially lost market position,
a challenge to the practice should be dismissed. Five years
is arbitrary. The length of time should depend on how difficult it is to enter the business-considering entry barriers
(costs borne by the new firms that were not borne by the
existing ones), entry hurdles (costs that would not be recoverable if entry were abandoned, an important consideration in any strategic decision about entry), and the entry lag (how long entry takes even if there are low hurdles
and no barriers). The lower the barriers, hurdles, and lags,
the less time a court should require before it deems that
new entry would have smothered any anticompetitive
practice.
No matter how we define a "persistent" practice, the
most reasonable inference is that a persistent practice is
persistently beneficial to consumers. Long-term vertical
arrangements cannot usefully be explained as cartelfacilitating practices. Cartels themselves rarely last five
years. Although vertical arrangements may slow down entry, they do not interdict it. By the time five years has
elapsed, most or all of the anticipated entry will have occurred. If the practice has survived for five years, it is
probably beneficial; if it is not, its demise in the market
probably will precede its demise at the hands of a court.
Anticompetitive business practices customarily predecease the litigation they spawn.
5. The Identity of the Plaintiff. The antitrust laws
are designed to prevent reductions in output and the associated higher prices. Yet higher prices are privately beneficial to the producers. Firms seek to enhance price when
they can. One way to do so is to impose costs on rivals, for
when rivals have higher costs the price in the market rises.
(The price is set by the costs of the highest-cost producer
able to stay in business.) Antitrust may be useful in raising
rivals' costs. A judicial declaration that some efficient
business practice is unlawful will raise costs of production, because the rival must shift to the next-mostexpensive method. The imposition of costs may be more
direct: treble damages are a cost of doing business, as are
the costs of legal assistance, the costs of changing business
plans to steer clear of antitrust exposure, and the diversion
of the time and energy of executives from production to
litigation. Antitrust counterclaims are a common reply to
contract or patent litigation precisely because they greatly
raise costs.
Antitrust litigation is attractive as a method of raising
rivals' costs because of the asymmetrical structure of incentives. The plaintiffs costs of litigation will be smaller
than the defendant's. The plaintiff need only file the complaint and serve demands for discovery. If the plaintiff
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wins, the defendant will bear these legal costs. The defendant, on the other hand, faces treble damages and injunction, as well as its own (and even its rival's) costs of litigation. The principal burden of discovery falls on the
defendant. The defendant is apt to be larger, with more
files to search, and to have control of more pertinent documents than the plaintiff.
Because of the asymmetries of the costs, antitrust may
be a cheaper (and more effective) means of imposing costs
on one's rivals than is resort to the political and administrative process. A firm seeking political relief from competition bears the bulk of the costs. It must overcome the
difficulty of organizing a political coalition. The rivals get
the benefit of inertia and instability; a political victory
may be short-lived. In litigation, though, most costs and
risks fall on the defendant, and the plaintiff's victory may
last a long time. Regulation by antitrust cannot be undone
through notice-and-comment rulemaking.
It is therefore important to find ways to reduce the attractiveness of antitrust as a method of raising rivals'
costs, while at the same time preserving the power of antitrust to help consumers. One line worth drawing is between suits by rivals and suits by consumers. Business rivals have an interest in higher prices, while consumers seek
lower prices. Business rivals seek to raise the costs of production, while consumers have the opposite interest. The
books are full of suits by rivals for the purpose, or with the
effect, of reducing competition and increasing price. The
Department of Justice, recognizing that public suits also
may restrain competition, is reviewing existing antitrust
decrees. Courts cannot review old decrees on their own
motion, but they should be careful not to create new restraints. They therefore should treat suits by horizontal
competitors with the utmost suspicion. They should dismiss outright some categories of litigation between rivals
and subject all such suits to additional scrutiny.
One category of complaints that should not be entertained at all concerns lower prices. Here the suit seeks protection from competition, and dismissal should be automatic. The Brunswick doctrine implements this proposal
for some cases. The plaintiff in Brunswick was a bowling
center attacking Brunswick's acquisition of other bowling
centers. It complained that the acquisition kept in the market bowling emporiums that otherwise would have failed,
thus diverting business from its lanes to Brunswick's and
producing lower prices. The lower courts held the acquisitions unlawful (because Brunswick ended up with a large
market share) and awarded plaintiff treble its lost profits.
The Supreme Court dispatched the suit quickly, pointing
out that the antitrust objection to mergers is higher prices,
not lower ones, and that plaintiff's injury therefore was
not compensable. All business practices cause dislocations
and losses-the most successful practices cause the deepest losses-but antitrust does not offer insurance against
competitive injury.
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Brunswick's "antitrust injury doctrine" has been extended beyond mergers. It is usually put as a restriction on
remedies, though, and this diverts attention from the real
problem. Brunswick responds to the fact that often the
lure of damages (or the ability to raise rivals' costs) induces plaintiffs to challenge conduct that is procompetitive. The suits impose costs whether plaintiffs win or not;
worse, given the unavoidable number of erroneous decisions in antitrust cases, the suits bring condemnation on
useful conduct. The best way to deal with this is to generalize the Brunswick approach.
The suit by Chrysler against the General Motors (GM)Toyota joint venture is a prime example. GM and Toyota
agreed to make sub-compact cars at a plant in California.
The FTC investigated the proposal for almost a year, concerned that the joint venture was a mask for broader cooperation and would assist GM and Toyota in reducing
their joint output. If the jointly-produced car should replace independent projects by each firm or induce Toyota
to import fewer cars, it could have such an effect. The
FTC, GM, and Toyota finally agreed on a consent judgment limiting the extent of the cooperation. Chrysler
promptly filed suit against the joint venture.
The identity of the plaintiff is all the court needs to
know. There are two hypotheses about the GM-Toyota
agreement: one is that the two firms are conniving to reduce output and drive up prices, and the other is that they
have found a way to combine their skills to make a new car
at lower costs than either could alone. (A third is that the
venture evades import restrictions. This has the same implications as the second hypothesis.) If the first hypothesis
is true, then Chrysler will be a winner. It will reap the
higher prices without having to reduce its own output. If
the second hypothesis is true, then Chrysler will be injured
by the ensuing price reduction and erosion of sales. Chrysler's suit demonstrates that it views the second hypothesis
as the correct one. Because only the first hypothesis supports an antitrust objection, the suit contains the formula
of its own dismissal. Any other suit by a business rival
against a merger or joint venture should be dismissed for
the same reason.
Almost the same analysis applies to predatory practices
suits brought by firms that have not left the market. Some
of these suits explicitly request the court to order a business rival to raise price, and they may be dismissed
quickly. The standard tale of predatory pricing (which is
identical for these purposes to any other exclusionary
practice) is that the aggressor inflicts fatal wounds on the
rival in period one in order to drive it out of business, and
thus collect monopoly profits in period two. If the rival
does not depart, however, it will collect the same price in
period two as the aggressor. If there never are monopoly
prices, the case fails the second filter because the aggressor
receives no profit from its conduct. Often, though, it is
hard to tell whether the aggressor's conduct raised price. If
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the effect on price is uncertain, the suit by the surviving rival still should be dismissed. The plaintiff collects the
same prices in today's market as the defendant. If the
course of conduct creates a monopoly profit for the aggressor, it creates one for the plaintiff too. The plaintiff
has little reason to challenge a business practice with this
effect. Plaintiff's ideal world is to collect monopoly
profits today and also obtain reimbursement for losses
sustained in the period of aggression. But if the plaintiff
expects to stay in business, this is not an obtainable end.
The award of damages will make similar episodeswhich, by hypothesis, yield net benefits to plaintiff and
defendant-unprofitable for the defendant. The plaintiff
does not want to kill the goose that laid the golden egg.
Thus a court should infer from the challenge that the net
effect of the defendant's conduct has been to reduce rather
than increase price.
Many other plaintiffs also have the wrong incentives.
Antitrust suits by the targets of tender offers often are designed to protect the managers' jobs or to increase the
price paid for the target, rather than to protect consumers
from higher prices. Targets may bring such litigation even
though the sole effect of the acquisition would be to increase the joint firms' efficiency. Targets therefore are inappropriate plaintiffs.
IV. Conclusion
Antitrust is an imperfect tool for the regulation of competition. Imperfect because we rarely know the right
amount of competition there should be, because neither
judges nor juries are particularly good at handling complex economic arguments, and because many plaintiffs
are interested in restraining rather than promoting competition.
The per se rule is not a satisfactory response to these
problems. Condemnation per se rests on a conclusion that
all or almost all examples of some category of practices
are inefficient, yet we cannot reach such a judgment for
any practice other than naked horizontal restraints. The
traditional Rule of Reason falls prey to all of the limits of
antitrust. It assumes that judges can tap a fount of economic knowledge that does not exist, and it disregards the
costs of judicial decision-making (including the costs of
damning efficient conduct by mistake or design). Something must be done.
That "something" is to replace the existing method of
antitrust analysis with a series of simple filters. Each filter
should be designed to screen out beneficent conduct and
pass only practices that are likely to reduce output and increase price. The filter approach shares with the per se approach the judgment that such screening should be done
by category of case rather than one case at a time. The
courts should establish rules, recognizing that one cost of
decision by rule is occasional over- and under-breadth.
The filters deal with the ingredients of anticompetitive
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practices. If there is no market power, if the defendant
cannot profit by reducing output, or if the conduct fails
any of the other tests, there is no substantial competitive
problem. Each filter errs, if at all, on the side of permitting questionable practices. Yet precision is unobtainable,
and the bias in favor of business practices is appropriate.
The price of case-by-case inquiry into the actual competitive consequences of business practices is large. The price
includes prohibiting some efficient practices and deterring
others. What we get in exchange today is not worth this
price.
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